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A proper interdisciplinary approach to the human sciences requires the application of concepts 
common to all disciplines with the highest relevance in each. We suggest that the concepts of envy, 
admiration, and fear, together with the concept of fatherhood offer a conceptual framework able to 
describe human behavior in a wide range of contexts. Indeed, to be a human being is to feel inferior, a 
condition that gives birth to three major passions: envy, admiration, and fear. On the other hand, to be 
superior is always to hold the place of a father figure. Then we show that these concepts, which are 
self-evident in morality, philosophy, theology, and psychology, can be applied broadly as well in 
anthropology, sociology, economics, and politics. Finally, we conduct a brief case study on gang 
violence to show the relevance of this conceptual framework. 
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Introduction: 
An interdisciplinary approach to the human sciences that would enable us to integrate 
knowledge across disciplines would require the identification of concepts that could be applied in all 
disciplines, while showing in each of these the highest relevance. We suggest that the concepts of 
envy, admiration, and fear, applied together with the concept of fatherhood, offer us a conceptual 
framework able to describe human behavior across the widest range of situations. These concepts 
belong naturally to morality, philosophy, theology, and psychology, but are more rarely applied in 
anthropology, sociology, economics, and politics. In the first section, we show that our conceptual 
framework lies on one essential characteristic of the human condition: inferiority. In the second 
section, we show that to be in the position of superiority is necessarily to be in the position of a father 
figure charged with the regulation of inferiors’ admiration, envy, and fear. In the third section, we 
demonstrate that the feeling of inferiority expressed by admiration, envy, and fear, and the superiority 
expressed by fatherhood, are in fact relevant across the core social sciences. In the last section, we 
apply our conceptual framework to violence, one of the major questions for human societies and one 
which invariably requires an interdisciplinary approach. 
 
1. To be human is to feel inferior 
The original and ontological position of the human being is one of inferiority. Human beings 
begin their lives in a stage of inferiority, or “weakness502”, as the age of childhood was first 
characterized by Rousseau (1774). During this age, children learn to deal with three main positions 
relative to others: superiority, equality, and inferiority. Vis-à-vis these three possible positions, the 
child must develop a “social feeling“ that separates him from the animals. In each case, the 
relationship of the child with the other takes a specific form, as Proudhon (1840) noted: “in the 
strong, it is the pleasure of generosity; between equals, it is frank and cordial friendship, in the weak, 
it is the happiness of admiration and gratefulness
503”. However as a matter of fact, the child’s original 
and predominant position, and consequently humanity’s original position, is one of inferiority. The 
social and psychological development of a human being starts with an awareness of inferiority that 
                                                          
502 J.-J. Rousseau, 1774, Emile ou de l’éducation, Livre III, GF-Flammarion, Paris, 1966, p.211. 
503 P.-J. Proudhon, 1840, Qu’est ce que la propriété?, chap. V, 1rst part, §3, Le Monde Flammarion, Paris, 2009, p.250. 
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needs to be accepted and overcome, especially by learning to express admiration and gratefulness. 
Throughout life, ontological limits (biological, psychological, and spiritual), will always remind men 
of their original position and the associated feeling of inferiority. Alfred Adler (1933) argues that the 
human condition faces the ordeal of inferiority: “To be human means to feel inferior504”. According 
to Adler, neuroses are caused by the comparison with others, which generates the “inferiority 
complex”. The encounter with the neighbor is the encounter with the essential difference, which 
through comparison is inevitably converted into inferiorities, equalities, and superiorities. Each new 
encounter is a fresh opportunity to confront once again the inferiority or weakness, which has 
remained since childhood. 
The feeling of inferiority generates three things: admiration, fear and envy. Feelings of 
inferiority, weakness, smallness, or imperfection can emerge every time the subject encounters any 
kind of superiority, strength, greatness, or perfection, regardless of whether the comparison be 
objective or subjective. Faced with a position or a feeling of inferiority, the subject has three possible 
reactions: admiration, fear, or envy. Admiration is the love of greatness, “a happy recognition of a 
‘superior’ otherness505”. To fear is to feel threatened by something or someone that is perceived as 
stronger than us. Thus fear is also the implicit admission of inferiority. Envy consists as well in the 
perception of others as threats: it is the suffering caused by not possessing the superiority of another. 
And consequently, as Pliny the Younger said: “To envy it is to admit being inferior506”. The envious 
feels persecuted, victims of others. In that sense, envy can be seen as a sort of fear. As a matter of 
necessity, envy contains fear. Those in privileged positions often feel threatened by the envy of the 
less privileged. Envy and fear lead to hostility, hate, betrayal and aggression. Envy and fear destroy 
the capacity to admire, although an unhealthy admiration is implicit in envy. “Jealousy is a secret 
admiration. A person who admires and feels that he cannot be happy by giving in to his feeling 
chooses to be jealous of the object of his admiration. Admiration is the happy abandonment of the 
self, jealousy his unhappy claim
507” says Kierkegaard (1849). Fear converts admiration into envy 
when suddenly the feeling of a threat emerges in admiration. However, admiration can dispel fear and 
envy because it leads to sympathy, benevolence, devotion, friendship, and love. Each of these three 
passions triggers two main dynamics of interaction with others respectively: for envy, rivalry and 
destruction; for fear, destruction and submission; and for admiration, emulation and devotion. Envy 
focuses on the negative, whereas admiration focuses on the positive. Admiration triggers a non-
confrontational mimesis of emulation, whereas envy triggers a conflicting mimesis of appropriation. 
Likewise, fear triggers a conflicting mimesis of aggression. Thus, we can relate envy and admiration 
respectively to Veblen’s “predatory” and “workmanship” instincts. Carl Schmitt’s distinction between 
“friend” and “enemy” can be interpreted as originating respectively in admiration and fear/envy. The 
three passions emerge from the same position of inferiority. What makes one prevail over another is 
the psychological reaction of the subject: whether he will accept it (admiration), deny it (envy), or flee 
from it (fear). If the subject accepts his abasement, he will experience a feeling of humility. On the 
other hand, if he resists his abasement, he will experience a feeling of humiliation. In the first case, 
the feeling of inferiority is chosen, in the second case, it is undergone. Humility paves the way to 
admiration whereas humiliation paves the way to envy. The act of fleeing in case of fear usually gives 
rise to an even stronger feeling of humiliation than envy. Adler observed that the feeling of inferiority 
gives birth to a feeling of insecurity and a need for protection. The three passions reveal that human 
beings need to be protected and recognized by some superiority. In other words, admiration, fear, and 
envy call for a father. Actually, the father is generally the first experience of superiority in childhood. 
In other terms, his presence teaches one how to be inferior. 
 
2. To be superior is to be like a father 
The father also teaches us the way to be superior. For Comte (1851-54), fatherhood is what 
teaches us to love our inferiors: “As sons, we learn to venerate our superiors, and as brothers to 
                                                          
504 A. Adler, 1933, Le sens de la vie, (Trad. H. Schaffer), Éditions Payot, Paris, 1968, Chapter 6, p.62. 
505 M. Crépu, 1988, La force de l’admiration, Éditions Autrement, Paris, p.47. 
506 Pliny the Younger, Letters, VI, XVII.    
507 S. Kierkegaard, 1849, La maladie à la mort, 2nd section, Appendix to chapter 1, p129. 
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cherish our equals. But it is fatherhood that teaches us directly to love our inferiors.
508” He associates 
goodness narrowly with protection: “Actual goodness implies always a sort of protection, which, 
without being incompatible with filial and fraternal relations, does not constitute an essential element 
of them. It belongs to marriage only for man (…). Paternal affection will maintain its natural aptitude 
to develop, better than any other affection, the vastest social feeling, the one that pushes us directly to 
satisfy the needs of our fellows. The protection in it shows spontaneously a charm and an intensity 
which could not exist elsewhere, because it appears devoid of all equivocal reciprocity.
509” Proudhon 
defines the social feeling of the strong vis-à-vis the weak as the pleasure of generosity. There is no 
one who takes more pleasure in generosity towards the weak than the father with his children. Like 
the “père Goriot” of Balzac, he gives them everything, because he loves them; like Harry Lowman in 
“Death of a Salesman” he is prepared to die for them. A father is a protective, educative, benevolent, 
and loving authority who aims to help his son to grow and blossom. The father inspires admiration 
and assuages fear and envy. Admiration of the father is most notably a product of his force or his 
courage, which permits him to triumph over fear. By his example, he teaches courage. He represents 
the ideal superiority because through him admiration prevails over fear: as a superior, he gives 
justifications and makes decisions that prevent envy vis-à-vis peers, and he gives a model to imitate 
for relationships with inferiors. Ruskins (1862) suggests that the golden rule of leadership is what we 
can call “the rule of fatherhood”: “The way he (the boss) would treat his son, so this should always be 
the way he treats each of his men. Here is the truthful, practical, or effective RULE we can give on 
this point to the political economy.
510” In daily life, when we want to communicate that a professor, 
boss, or other authority figure has made a positive impact on our lives, we usually say: “this person 
has been like a father for me”. And everybody understands what this means. 
 
3. The relevance of “feelings of inferiority” and the “father-like superiority” in social sciences 
Now we shall examine whether this conceptual framework can adequately be applied to the 
core social sciences: social psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, and politics. 
 
3.1.  The rise of the psychology of social emotions 
Childhood is the age of admiration because everything is new and surprising. It is the age of 
fear because everything is a potential threat. It is the age of envy and jealousy because the gap 
between desires and power is at its maximum. Finally, it is the age of the encounter with the father, 
through which the child channels these three emotions as notably Freud, Klein, and Adler have 
shown. Fear is a primary emotion whereas envy and admiration are commonly seen as secondary, 
social, complex, moral, or intellectual emotions. The seminal work of the psychologist Frijda (1986) 
provides an analytical framework to describe emotions
511
. A great deal of research has been done to 
establish a comprehensive taxonomy of emotions. Building notably on Frijda’s works, Elster (1999) 
has conducted extensive research on the introduction of social emotions into social sciences after 
having demonstrated the limits of the hypothesis of rationality. His works imply a certain ranking 
among social emotions: he devotes extensive effort to the analysis of envy on human behavior and its 
social impact whereas relatively little to fear and almost none to admiration. 
 
3.2. Anthropology shows the universality of social emotions 
Admiration, fear, and envy are universal emotions that can be observed in all societies. One 
shares fear with the animals, whereas admiration and envy are specific to humanity. Admiration, 
together with fear, is the origin of magical and animist thought, as well as the religious feeling (Vico 
(1725), Proudhon (1840), Otto (1917)). Admiration is also at the origin of the philosophy (Plato, 
Aristotle, Hobbes or Schopenhauer). Freud (1927) conceives of religion as a reaction to the childhood 
experience of powerlessness and dependency vis-à-vis the father. Therefore, the fact that there is no 
                                                          
508 A. Comte, 1851-54, Système de politique positive, Tome II, p.189. 
509 Ibid. 
510 J. Ruskin, 1862, Unto this Last (translated in french: Il n’y a de richesse que la vie), éditions Pas de côté, Vierzon, 2012, 
p.42. 
511 N. H. Frijda, 1986, The Emotions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Frijda describes each emotion in terms of 
valence, intensity, intentional object, action tendency, physiological reaction, and cognitive antecedent. 
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culture without religion means that there is no culture without admiration, fear, and fatherhood. The 
apparent disenchantment of the world observed by Vico, Weber, Comte, or Proudhon can be 
interpreted as a loss of the capacity to admire. In his seminal work on envy, Schoeck (1966) argued 
that: “At every period of History, at every level of civilization, in most languages, and no matter the 
forms of the society, men have been aware of one fundamental problem of their existence and have 
underlined its particular character: the feeling of envy and the fact of being envied.
512” He provides 
numerous examples of envious behaviors in primitive societies (e.g. Navajo, Hopi, Azande). He also 
notes that envy is universally blamed and condemned. Likewise, Foster (1972) argued that envy is “a 
pan-human phenomenon, abundantly present in every society, and present to a greater or lesser 
extent in every human being.
513” The question of the universality of fatherhood is more complex, 
notably because it requires the discovery of biological fatherhood that was probably not known in 
primitive human societies. For this reason the primary human societies were likely to be matriarchal, 
characterized notably by the absence of the role of the biological father in the education of children. 
In contemporary matriarchal societies, notably in Africa, the “avunculus” or maternal uncle usually 
replaces the father in the role of a loose father figure. 
 
3.3. The discovery of the “relative deprivation” in sociology 
Tocqueville grasped and outlined the overarching importance of envy in democratic societies, 
hidden, in his words, behind the “passion for equality”. Admiration is a fundamental dimension of the 
social feeling (Proudhon) and is essential for the stability of the social hierarchy (Smith
514
) as well as 
for the maintenance of trust, cooperation, and solidarity in the society. Conversely, envy and fear 
dissolve the social order, by generating distrust, conflict (Simmel), violence (Girard), and revolution 
(Tocqueville). Sociology deals with envy through the notions of “relative deprivation” and 
“comparative reference group” (Stouffer, Merton, Runciman). In a study on American soldiers, 
Stouffer (1949) observed that soldiers who belonged to the Military Police, where opportunities for 
promotion were very poor, were in fact more satisfied with opportunities for promotion than those 
who belonged to the Air Corps, where opportunities for promotion were conspicuously good. It seems 
counterintuitive that the better the chances of promotion, the less happy the soldiers. Yet in fact, when 
promotions are relatively numerous, each expects to be promoted; and consequently those who are not 
are disappointed and frustrated in comparison with their fellows. As a group, the entire Air Corp is 
less satisfied as a result. Stouffer and his associates have coined the notion of “relative deprivation” to 
describe this. Runciman (1966) has offered a more rigorous formulation of the notion of “relative 
deprivation” by linking it to the notion of “reference group” in his study on the attitudes to social 
inequality. But the concept of “relative deprivation” as Runciman defines it, is a clinical and sanitized 
concept - it describes what can be observed and is therefore a tautology. To say that a subject lacking 
in an element possessed by his fellow is “relatively deprived” is a simple statement of fact, it offers no 
analysis or causative detail
515
. For Runciman, “the idea of “relative deprivation” (…) provides the 
key to the complex and fluctuating relation between inequality and grievance.
516” He defends this 
notion because “ (…) relative deprivation retains the merit of being value-neutral as between a 
feeling of envy and a perception of injustice. To establish what resentment of inequality can be 
vindicated by an appeal to social justice will require that this distinction should somehow be 
made.
517” So, “relative deprivation” is value-neutral but to become really useful, additional 
                                                          
512 H. Schoeck, 1966, L’envie Histoire du mal, (Trad. Georges Pauline), Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2006, p.7.  
513 G. Foster, 1972, The Anatomy of Envy, A Study in Symbolic Behavior, Current Anthopology, vol. 13, N°2, p.165. He 
observed personally envious behaviors in villages in Mexico but he found examples of envious behaviors in Mediterranean 
cultures, in the Arab world, in Asia and in Latin America. 
514 “This disposition to admire, and almost to venerate, the rich and the powerful (…) (is) necessary to both establish and 
maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of the society (…).” In A. Smith, 1759, Théorie des sentiments moraux, Part 
I, Section III, chap. III, puf, Paris, 1999, p.103. 
515 Runciman defines it as follows: “we can roughly say that A is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he 
sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X (whether or 
not this is or will be in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X. Possession of X 
may, of course, mean avoidance of or exemption from Y.” (p.10).  
516 Runciman, W. G., Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, Gregg Revivals, 1966, p.6. 
517
 Ibid., p.10. 
1st Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference, AIIC 2013, 24-26 April, Azores, Portugal               - Proceedings- 
892 
 
investigations must be made to know whether the relative deprivation falls into the category of envy 
or injustice (which in terms of passion translates into indignation). As a purely descriptive notion, 
relative deprivation is also static: it does not say anything about the motivations and consequences of 
individuals’ behaviors, whereas envy or indignation as emotions provide “tendency to actions”. 
Looting and vandalism are typically manifestations of social envy. The more costly the destruction for 
those who perpetrate it, the stronger their envy. Moreover, analysis on envy always needs to be 
conducted in connection with its relationship to admiration. Smith and Veblen, for instance, have 
shown that the human need to be admired is essential to preserving good self-esteem. Finally, the 
notion of relative deprivation is dedicated here to the question of social justice and consequently to 
possessions. Envy is wider and includes the feeling of deprivation from ontological qualities (beauty, 
strength etc.). 
 
3.4. The Homo Economicus is an envious and fearful orphan adult interacting with the 
“inoffensive anonymous” 
Economics supposes that individuals are purely rational: their behavior is determined by their 
personal interest which consists in maximizing their well-being. In order to do so, they make their 
choice based on an analysis of costs and benefits. Thanks to game theory, economists are able to 
examine the decision making process in strategic interactions with others. Let us note that by the 
classical definition, rational individuals are not supposed to take emotional motivations into account 
when they make decisions. To discover where this hypothesis can have relevant applications in real 
life we must locate those circumstances where individuals have no fear, no envy, no admiration, and 
no fatherhood. This corresponds to situations in which, firstly, individuals do not know those with 
whom they interact: the others are anonymous. Secondly, individuals are not afraid to be hurt by these 
anonymous persons because either they feel protected, or they believe that these anonymous persons 
are “inoffensive”. We usually meet “inoffensive anonymous” persons, as economic agents on large 
and competitive markets (financial markets are probably the best example), or as citizens of a large 
city where people are civilized and respect the rule of law. In both cases, individuals often remain 
anonymous in most interactions with the civil society at large. On the other hand, in oligopolistic 
markets where the number of actors is limited and all are known to each other, the free rider strategy 
will generate social pressure and retaliations. Indeed, Olson (1965) has shown that the size of the 
group determines to a large extent the emergence of free riders: the group needs to be big enough to 
ensure anonymity
518
. Economists describe a peaceful and emotionless world, which corresponds to a 
“controlled environment”. The application of game theory in economics corresponds principally to 
interactions with the inoffensive anonymous. The “prisoner’s dilemma” presents a situation where 
two accomplices are arrested and interviewed separately (i.e protected from one another but also 
exposed to betrayal). They should have interest to cooperate with each other (i.e not confess their 
crime) but find, according to game theory, strong incentives to confess and betray each other because 
whatever their accomplice chooses as his strategy (to confess or not), the strategy of confession yields 
a better personal situation
519. Both of them betray. The situations where a prisoner’s dilemma can 
occur are also often situations of “not seen not caught” (such as free riders, athletes’ doping, false 
illness in the workplace, etc.) and/or where the protagonists cannot communicate with each other. In 
short, from the hypothesis of people as purely rational actors, who represent the “inoffensive 
anonymous” for each other, who are not able to communicate with each other and consequently to 
establish a relationship, and/or who stand in situations of “not seen not caught”, the standard 
economic theory predicts the absence of cooperation, trust, and loyalty between them. Actually, the 
conclusion is already in the point of departure. Assuming people are selfish, the model tells us that 
they behave selfishly. It is tautological and lies on a petition of principle: we assume what should be 
demonstrated. Moreover, it is not certain that the hypothesis of rationality does not include passions. 
In fact, the idea of maximization of self satisfaction betrays (1) the exclusive concern of the self, (2) 
the violent desire to enjoy and to possess, (3) the fear to lose, to be a loser and to feel inferior because 
                                                          
518 M. Olson, 1965, Logique de l’action collective, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, (trad. Mario Levi), 2011.   
519 By confessing, if my accomplice stays silent I maximize my gain, if he betrays me I minimize my penalty. My 
accomplice has the same reasoning. 
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of losing, together with the unpleasant feeling that someone else is gaining more, (4) a total absence 
of filial feelings in the case of inferiority and paternal feelings in the case of superiority. In a nutshell, 
the hypothesis of rationality implies invariably selfishness, greed, fearfulness, envy, and domination. 
Hirschman (1977) has shown that the notion of “interest” was elaborated only in the 16th and 17th 
centuries as the insertion of a third term between reason and passion, which was supposed to borrow 
the best of these two types by giving birth to a sort of reasonable self-love. But it corresponds in 
reality to “the accession of cupidity to the rank of privileged passion in charge of subduing dangerous 
passions and of bringing a substantial contribution to the art of government.”520 Therefore, it is 
difficult to believe in the methodological amoralism of economics
521
. Is it a coincidence that students 
of economics are less cooperative than their peers who do not study economics? (Frank et al, 1993) In 
real life, those who most typically embody the Homo Economicus are immature and poorly socialized 
adults. Fortunately, experiments undertaken by economists show that in real situations, people 
cooperate, are trustworthy and loyal, thus contradicting the predictions of the standard economic 
model. These experiments show that the hypothesis of rationality is limited to interactions with 
inoffensive anonymous agents. For instance, some experiments demonstrate that when players have 
the opportunity to communicate before the game, the level of cooperation increases tremendously 
(Sally, 1995), especially when it takes place “face to face” (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1998). Indeed, 
in this case, they no longer play with an anonymous agent but with a specific person they have met 
that has consequently and inevitably affected them emotionally. This person has become familiar, 
which completely changes the subject’s behavior. Sally (1995, 2000) also observes that the degree of 
familiarity between partners influences the cooperation rate (physical and social contact, shared 
preferences and opinions, etc.). Gächter and Fehr (1999) have shown that when a little familiarity 
between people has been established (“team spirit effect”), and that at the end of the game their 
respective contribution to the public good will become public (“social pressure effect”), the level of 
cooperation increases substantially. In consequence, the theory of rational choice cannot be extended 
to all realms of human behaviors such as criminality, marriage or family as Gary Becker (1976, 1991) 
attempted to do. It can only be applied to relationships between inoffensive anonymous agents which 
cannot communicate with each other and/or who are in a situation of “not seen not caught”. Once we 
know the persons, emotions are necessarily involved (especially admiration, envy, fear, and 
fatherhood). 
Proper interpretation of admiration and envy can also help us to better understand the value of 
objects and the determination of their price. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith noted 
that people’s consumption beyond “the necessity of nature” (food, housing, clothing) is driven by the 
need to be admired (and thus approved of) and consequently by the envy of greatness and distinction. 
Veblen (1899) has followed this intuition, showing that not all human action has a goal determined by 
the calculation of pains and pleasures. He developed the notions of “conspicuous consumption” and 
“invidious comparison” to explain the need to gain distinction and others’ esteem or consideration 
through inciting others’ envy. Classical economists could not solve the “paradox of the water and the 
diamond” formulated by Adam Smith: there is nothing more useful than water and yet it has almost 
no exchange value, whereas diamonds are totally useless but have a high exchange value. Neoclassic 
economists found a solution by developing the notion of “marginal utility”: the utility of the last unit 
of a good available for our consumption. Diamonds are scarce whereas water is abundant. That is why 
water has no exchange value and a diamond a high one. However, many objects are scarce and yet 
have no exchange value, such as a lame and one-eyed donkey. The object needs also to be commonly 
admired. Ruskin has this intuition: “The price of gold depends less of its scarcity – which is in 
common with cerium or iridium – than from its solar color and its inalterable purity, by which it 
arouses admiration and gains mankind’s confidence.522” Thus, an additional element needs to be 
                                                          
520 A. O. Hirschman, 1977, The Passions and the Interests, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Les passions et les intérêts, 
Quadrige puf, Paris, 1980, (Trad. Pierre Andler), p.41. 
521 Frank et al (1993) have observed a cooperation rate of 61,2% by non-economics students against 39,6% for economics 
students. Moreover, the cooperation rate decreases along the cursus of the students in economics whereas it increases for 
non-economists, tending to show that the more we study economics the more selfishly we behave, unless economics attracts 
people who are already selfish.  
522 J. Ruskin, op.cit., p.99. 
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added to the explanation of marginal utility in order for the paradox to be resolved adequately: that 
element is admiration. People admire the beauty of diamonds, and can posture superiority vis-à-vis 
others through their possession, whereas water, though beautiful, is incapable of inspiring admiration 
in terms of possession, owing to its abundance. Admiration for diamonds determines the intensity of 
the desire to acquire the object, or what Ruskin calls “the force of consumer’s intention to buy523”. 
The notion of use value is too narrowly linked to physiological and security needs (food, clothes, 
house, etc.). But once we move up Maslow's hierarchy in order to satisfy our needs in terms of 
belonging, esteem, and self actualization, we increasingly purchase objects that are useless but 
covetable and admired by others. We buy objects because we admire them in others. In developed 
economies, the share of goods that are useless but highly admirable is increasing and represents the 
largest portion of the consumer’s basket of goods. In the 19th century, Ruskin already noticed that: 
“Three-fourths of the world demand is romantic, founded on visions, idealisms, hopes, and affections; 
and the regulation of the purse is, in essence, the regulation of the imagination and the heart. The true 
discussion on the nature of price is therefore a metaphysical and material problem of first 
importance.
524” A good gains in value at a rate comparable with an increasing number of admirers. 
The number of admirers determines, for instance, the value of a painting, a song, a movie, or a show. 
 
3.5. People are governed through admiration, envy, fear, and fatherhood 
The central question of power in politics can be reshuffled by starting from the psychological 
impression made on individuals by those who govern. As Ferrero (1945) says: “The right to command 
can only be justified by the superiority.
525”At the psychological level, this means that the government 
has managed to ensure its position by leading with a mixture of admiration, envy, fear, and 
fatherhood. 
 
Government by admiration 
Sacred and supernaturally justified governments lead people mainly by admiration and awe, 
whether the chief is a god, a son of a god, in communication with spirits, ancestors or gods, or 
lieutenant of God on earth. The power “comes from above”. Heroic or aristocratic governments 
justify admiration as well, when they are what Vico (1725) calls the “government of the most 
powerful
526”. The prestige is acquired by heroic actions. In the Middle Ages and during the 
Renaissance, the genre of Mirrors for Princes (e.g. John Salisbury, Gilles de Rome), as well as the 
literature on knighthood, aimed to erect the prince as a model of virtue and an example for his people. 
This barrier of manners between the prince and his people is supposed to inspire admiration and 
affection. Following the tradition of the Mirrors for Princes, albeit in a revolutionary perspective, 
Machiavelli still devotes one chapter of “The Prince” to the ways in which “a prince must behave to 
acquire esteem” and another one to the ways he can “avoid contempt and hatred”. He recognizes that 
“the best fortress in the world (for a prince) is the affection of the people527”. And this requires that 
he is admired by them. Whether the prestige is supernatural or acquired by heroic actions or virtues, 
the government needs to regularly display its power and its wealth to the governed so as to maintain 
order. The leader feels the necessity to shine or to disappear. That is why he provides food, gifts (e.g. 
potlatch), and games. In modern times, admiration and awe are still major instruments of government. 
The divinity of the leader has been replaced by his exemplary character, behavior, and merits (e.g. 
Gandhi, De Gaulle, Lech Walesa, Nelson Mandela). Totalitarian regimes have also tried to use 
admiration as a mode of government through the cult of personality of their leaders (e.g. Lenin, Stalin, 
Hitler, Mao, etc.). Admiration proceeds from a spiritual distance or superiority between the 
government and the governed, created by the supernatural, heroism, virtues, or donations, which act to 
dispel people’s envy. Admiration stimulates the “good will”, i.e. the tendency to cooperate, to devote, 
and to sacrifice. These sorts of regimes maximize spontaneous obedience, loyalty, and devotion (up to 
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self-sacrifice) to the chief. Admiration leads to trust whereas envy and fear lead to distrust. The 
government by admiration creates the conditions for the emergence of an elite or an aristocracy. 
However, it must be noted that true admiration is an objective that cannot be directly sought because 
it normally emerges as a secondary effect of another action. Therefore, wanting to be admired is often 
the best way of failing to be so. True admiration comes to those who do not seek it. 
 
Government by fear 
 Canetti (1960) asserts that the “primitive order” derives from the flight instinct dictated by the 
presence of a stronger animal. The primitive order is a death penalty, which forces the victim to 
flee
528
. Hobbes argues that human beings are naturally fearful, especially of being killed. Men “fear 
each other rather than love each other
529”. For Hobbes, reciprocal fear has been at the very beginning 
of the civil society and the emergence of power: “ (…) the spirits of men are of such a nature, that if 
they are not detained by the fear of some sort of common power, they will fear each other, they will 
live with each other in an abiding distrust (…). 530” History shows indeed that times of anomie, 
anarchy, and revolution produce a tyrant who would restore a safe and peaceful social order. 
Machiavelli suggested that, in the case of a new power, it is easier to govern by fear than by love: “it 
is much more certain to be feared than to be loved (…) And men hesitate less to offend someone who 
wants to be loved than another who wants to be feared; because the link of love is spun of 
recognition: a fiber that men do not hesitate to break, because they are nasty, as soon as their 
personal interest is at stake; but the link of fear is spun by the fear of punishment that never leaves 
them.
531” Indeed, fear is a powerful instrument of government because it weakens and constrains the 
will of individuals. It creates a master-slave relationship because a frightened person is no longer free; 
he is forced to submit to ensure his security and protection or to flee if he can. The tyrant or the despot 
becomes both persecutor and protector. Tyrants, totalitarian states, mafias, and gangs govern 
essentially by fear. This implies the use of threats, intimidation, force, and violence. As Ferrero 
(1945) said, “force is fear in action532”. History shows however that governments which rely 
extensively on fear are unstable and not viable in the long run. They need to obtain the free consent of 
the governed; without it, the threat of revolution is always on the horizon. Justifiably therefore, those 
who govern by fear are inevitably fearful. They fear that the tables will be turned, and they will be 
forced to undergo the fate they have forced upon others. The despot, says Ferrero (1945), “is afraid of 
everything: by the most reserved and the most cautious critic, by the most innocent manifestation of 
discontentment that broods everywhere
533”. But for Ferrero (1945), regardless of whether or not the 
power uses fear, it is in its nature to feel fragile: “The Power is never safe, it constantly trembles. 534” 




Government by envy 
Politics is about regulating the envy of all against all. Schoeck (1966) suggests that the 
societies and civilizations that have reached the highest levels of development might in fact have been 
those that managed envy better than others. Indeed, envy threatens to ostracize or kill those who are 
bright and innovative. In Antiquity, for instance, Athens and a few other cities practiced ostracism, 
which consisted of a vote by the assembly of citizens to single out one citizen for banishment. 
According to Plutarch, ostracism was a manifestation of envy: ”Ostracism was not a punishment 
inflicted on guilty persons, it was called, to veil it with a specious name, a weakening, a reduction of 
an authority too proud of itself, of a power of which the weight was too heavy. It was, in reality, a 
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moderate satisfaction that one granted to envy (…)536”. Numerous societies throughout history have 
imposed special taxes on luxury goods to limit their consumption, and envy accordingly. Progressive 
taxation on income and redistribution policies aim to satisfy envy as well. Conversely, “divide and 
conquer” tactics (“Divide ut regnes”) usually excite envy among peers. This creates a power vacuum 
which the conqueror is able to use to his advantage. It consists of dividing people into categories to 
encourage their opposition to each other by claiming that some of them benefit from privileges that 
the others should have as well (rich/poor, white/black, men/women, etc.). To acquire power, political 
leaders promise to either provide all people with the same privileges or rather to abolish them 
outright. For Elster (1999), “(p)olitical systems that are both egalitarian and totalitarian seem to 
spawn envy. In China, during the Cultural Revolution, farmers with fruit trees were ordered to cut 
them down.
537” The principle followed here is that “nobody shall have what not all can have”. 
Democratic societies are also particularly exposed to this tendency toward egalitarianism, which in a 
way is the modern terminology for envy. Tocqueville has shown that equal social conditions intensify 
envy among citizens. “Scapegoating” is another ancestral mechanism employed to manipulate envy 
and to restore unanimity in the society. It consists of accusing a person, a group or a minority of 
responsibility for all of the evils in the society. Scapegoating functions by managing to unite the rest 
of the society against this victim (e.g. Oedipus accused of being guilty of the plague in Thebes and 
banished). Scapegoats are at the core of ideologies such as Marxism or Nazism. Envy deviates the 
will towards objectives detrimental to social harmony. It stimulates the “bad will” i.e. the tendency to 
be non-cooperative, aggressive, and to sacrifice the others. These sorts of regimes maximize 
spontaneous disobedience, disloyalty, and rebellion. 
 
Government by fatherhood 
Throughout the Ancient Regime, power was epitomized by the king, and the king was the 
embodiment of the father figure (Aristotle, St Thomas of Aquinas, Filmer, Bossuet). The essence of 
the monarchy was founded on fatherhood. Government by fatherhood is a synthesis of the three other 
forms. Against fear, the government by fatherhood offers protection. Protection is traditionally the 
principal kingly function. But in contrast with the government by fear, the proper government by 
fatherhood does not generate fear, as in a tyranny. Against envy, it offers justice and unity in the style 
of King Solomon or King Saint Louis. In contrast with the government by envy, it does not excite 
envy, it does not divide the people in order to dominate them, it does not promote egalitarianism, and 
it does not designate a scapegoat. In addition, against fear and envy, it offers clemency, benevolence, 
and sacrificial love. As in the government by admiration, it proceeds from a spiritual distance or 
superiority that prevents it from becoming the object of envy. But it refuses to be idolatrized. The 
government by fatherhood inspires the same “good will” as the government by admiration, but it does 
this to an even higher degree. 
 
4. A Case study on violence: The Maras 
The gangs of Central America known as the “Maras”538 are considered to be the most 
organized and the most violent in the world. These gangs are made up of children and young people 
between the ages of 9 and 25 from the poorest districts. Most of them are fatherless. Harper and 
McLanahan (2004) show that fatherless children are more likely to become criminals. Fatherless 
children enter these gangs essentially in search of the love and protection that their families are unable 
to provide for them. William Alexander, MS13 member, explains his decision to become a “marero” 
as follows: “I joined the MS13 when I was 13 years old. My father died in the war. My mother was 
alone with my three little brothers. This gang controlled the district. I found another “family” 
there.
539” Alex Sanchez, former MS13 member, gives a similar explanation about what young people 
expect to find when they enter the gangs: “It becomes like another family that provides love for them. 
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They find girlfriends, there is money, and there are drugs. The issue is that they really feel part of 
something, part of a group, and above all they find a sense of recognition and respect as part of the 
gang.
540” Alex Sanchez gives three major reasons for this: the search for a refuge, which dispels their 
feeling of insecurity generated to a large extent by the absence of a father, envy of gang members’ 
possessions (money, girls, drugs, prestige), and a need for admiration. Brenda Paz, MS13 member, 
describes the value system of the mareros as follows: “First of all, there is God, your mother, and 
then your gang. We live for God and for our mother, we die for our gang.
541“ There is no reference to 
the father: he is not in the picture because he is not in their lives. In the documentary La Vida Loca 
(2009), the director Christian Poveda shows a mother and her son before a judge in El Salvador. The 
mother confesses that her son overwhelms her. Her husband has left her and he does not take care of 
his children. She raises them alone. Her 17-year-old son does not listen to her and prefers to listen to 
his gang. She starts to cry. In the absence of an authority at home, children and teenagers strive to find 
one in the gangs. This situation can be observed in most places where gangs have emerged. In Haiti, 
for instance, the Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 indicates that: “ At Cité Soleil (a poor district), 
some chiefs of gangs have adopted a sort of parental status with children – who were lacking 
affection and of models of authority- and were often called “uncle” or “father”.542” The UK riots in 
August 2011 were called the “shopping riots543” (i.e. “envious riots”) by The Guardian. James 





Aristotle, Descartes, the French Moralists, Hume, and Smith, among others, all believed that 
the analysis of passions was necessary to understanding human nature. The 20th century has largely 
neglected the discussion of human passions because of the domination of functionalism, structuralism, 
and the theory of rational choice on the social sciences. The theory of rational choice, together with 
game theory, is still in a domination position, as it provides us with an elegant and integrative 
interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences. But it also means applying the economic approach to 
all human behaviors. It implies the belief that emotions can be the result of a rational choice through a 
cost-benefit analysis combining material and emotional satisfactions and costs. Becker defended this 
position: “the economic approach does not draw conceptual distinctions between major and minor 
decisions, such as those involving life and death in contrast to the choice of a brand of coffee; or 
between decisions said to involve strong emotions and those with little emotional involvement, such as 
in choosing a mate or the number of children in contrast to buying paint (…).545” In keeping with this 
insight, this paper has strived to sketch another integrative interdisciplinary approach of human 
behavior based on the most critical emotions experienced throughout the social life, as they originate 
in the ontological position of human beings (inferiority). Indeed, the daily news tends to show us that 
the rise of violent behaviors throughout the world seems to be caused mostly by fear, envy, and 
fatherlessness (criminality, mafias, gangs, terrorism, arms race, etc.). The social sciences are in need 
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